The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers, vol. 1

APPENDIX B: Contention of Irenaeus’ Two Apparent Contradictions Collapses

Some tenaciously claim that Irenaeus, in two instances in his five-book Treatise, teaches the inherent immortality of the soul. But we believe that this contention is not valid, and reject the claim for the following reasons: CFF1 1083.1

FIRST, doubt can justly be thrown upon the accuracy of some of the translated phrases (from Greek to Latin, then from Latin to English), the Latin translation being made at a period when the Augustinian thesis was dominant in the church. Bishop A. C. Coxe, reviser of the English translation, who furnished the Introduction and Notes for the standard Roberts and Donaldson ANF translation, quotes the translators as saying that the exact meaning of the text, both Latin and Greek, is often “most uncertain”; and that one of the “difficulties throughout, has been to fix the reading we should adopt.” Irenaeus’ style is often “involved and prolix.” ¹ And the translators even state that some of Irenaeus’ discussions may “seem almost unintelligible to the English reader,” and “scarcely more comprehensible to those who have pondered long on the original.” CFF1 1083.2

It is consequently obvious that too much reliance cannot be placed on the technical wording of these two particular passages that appear to be in conflict with the rest. Dependence must be placed rather on the complete, cumulative testimony of Irenaeus on the subject—the total evidence. Only that can be determinative. CFF1 1083.3

SECOND, it is illogical and unscholarly to insist that two isolated expressions, at least so translated, apparently affirming unconditional immortality, should nullify two score of positive statements, consisting of several distinct and complete lines of evidence, cumulatively establishing Conditional Immortality as his preponderant position. From the massed evidence we have just examined, it is obvious that Irenaeus emphatically did not believe that man has a never-dying soul, despite the reluctance of some to concede the facts. Dean Farrar rightly says, concerning Irenaeus’ testimony, “The sense of twelve, or any number of vague passages is to be explained by one definite passage; not it by them.” ² CFF1 1083.4

THIRD, inasmuch as Irenaeus, with great fullness, frequency, and varied forms of expression, taught that man is not innately and indefeasibly immortal according to divine purpose, would it not be amazing if in the five parts of the one single treatise Bishop Irenaeus should, with the same pen, maintain that the wicked were doomed to everlasting suffering—when he had already repeatedly declared that such were cut off from any chance of everlasting existence? Yet this is what some claim for him. But we affirm that, against these two most dubious expressions, there is a multiplicity of determinative evidence to the contrary. CFF1 1084.1

FOURTH, the dating of his treatise makes the contention most unlikely that Irenaeus in Gaul would have declared the soul to be immortal. As noted, his treatise was evidently written soon after A.D. 180, and not later than 188. But such a declaration on Immortal-Soulism, at that time, would have made him the pioneer herald of a revolutionary concept of the soul that had not yet been publicly set forth. It was not until Athenagoras of Athens (190), Clement of Alexandria (220), Minucius Felix of Africa (220), and especially Tertullian of Carthage (240), that this concept was brought into being in Christian ranks. CFF1 1084.2

1. FIRST CASE COLLAPSES UNDER SCRUTINY

Note the two passages in the ANF translation. Both are in book five. The first is directed against the Gnostic contention that the Demiurge had not the power to bestow immortality. And in the context Irenaeus remarks that things which are by nature immortal need no kindly help in order to live forever. The first perplexing passage is in chapter four, which opens with reference to— CFF1 1084.3

“those persons [Gnostics] who feign the existence of another Father beyond the Creator [the Demiurge], and who term him the good God, do deceive themselves; for they introduce him as a feeble, worthless, and negligent being, not to say malign and full of envy, inasmuch as they affirm that our bodies are not quickened by him. For when they say of things which it is manifest to all do remain immortal, such as the spirit and the soul, and such other things, that they are quickened by the Father, but that another thing [viz., the body] which is quickened in no different manner than by God granting [life] to it, is abandoned by life,—[they must either confess] that this proves their Father to be weak and powerless, or else envious and malignant.” ³

But the determinative “they say” clearly puts the contention on the lips of the Gnostics, and off the shoulders of Irenaeus. He denied their false and slanderous position regarding the Creator, and their allegation as to His impotence and malignity. In a score of places Irenaeus declares that Christ is omnipotent, that He is Creator and Redeemer, and the Bestower of immortality on the righteous only at the resurrection. Thus case number one collapses. CFF1 1084.4

After this introduction Irenaeus comments further: CFF1 1085.1

“For since the [true] Creator [Christ] does even here quicken [make alive] our mortal bodies, and promises them resurrection by the prophets, as I have pointed out; who [in that case] is shown to be more powerful, stronger, or truly good? Whether is it the Creator who vivifies the whole man, or is it their Father, falsely so called? He [the Gnostic Demiurge] feigns to be the quickener of those things which are immortal by nature, to which things life is always present by their very nature; but he does not benevolently quicken those things which required his assistance, that they might live, but leaves them carelessly to fall under the power of death. Whether is it the case, then, that their Father does not bestow life upon them when he has the power of so doing, or is it that he does not possess the power?” ⁴

Irenaeus is simply continuing to expose the falsity of their contention on the impotent Demiurge. To impute their false position to Irenaeus, who is denying and opposing it, is a grave injustice, for Irenaeus did not so believe. Irenaeus is here arguing against a false Gnostic distinction between persons in the Godhead—a powerless Demiurge—Creator and the “Good Father”—and their arbitrary and false argument against those fleshly and animal souls who have no possible hope of salvation and immortality. But God made all souls for eternal life. It is unrepentant sinners who deprive themselves of that great boon. This contention is borne out by the remainder of the chapter. CFF1 1085.2

2. SECOND CASE MERELY STATES GNOSTIC POSITION

The other case, in chapter seven, speaks of the resurrection. The passage shows that he calls the soul “immortal,” not absolutely but in comparison or contrast with the body, which dies and is dissolved. But not so with the soul, or spirit. Irenaeus apparently regarded death as a process of dissolution for the material body, whereas the soul merely comes to an end. Now note the introductory phrasing: CFF1 1085.3

“In the same manner, therefore, as Christ did rise in the substance of flesh, and pointed out to His disciples the mark of the nails and the opening in His side (now these are the tokens of that flesh which rose from the dead), so ‘shall He also,’ it is said, ‘raise us up by His own power.’ And again to the Romans he says, ‘But if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies.’” ⁵

Then comes the crucial passage, distinguishing between body and soul, and the “breath of life“: CFF1 1085.4

“What, then, are mortal bodies? Can they be souls? Nay, for souls are incorporeal when put in comparison with mortal bodies; for God ‘breathed into the face of man the breath of life, and man became a living soul.’ Now the nor to the spirit, for the spirit is simple and not composite, so that it cannot maintain that the very breath of life is mortal. Therefore David says, ‘My soul also shall live to Him,’ just as if its substance were immortal.” ⁶

Here again Irenaeus is arguing concerning Gnostic contentions, “just as if” they were so. But that is a far cry from assenting to their thesis of the innate Immortality of the “spiritual.” CFF1 1085.5

This distinction he develops in this further comment: CFF1 1086.1

“Neither, on the other hand, can they say that the spirit is the mortal body. What therefore is there left to which we may apply the term ‘mortal body,’ unless it be the thing that was moulded, that is, the flesh, of which it is also said that God will vivify it? For this it is which dies and is decomposed, but not the soul or the spirit. For to die is to lose vital power, and to become henceforth breathless, inanimate, and devoid of motion, and to melt away into those [component parts] from which also it derived the commencement of [its] substance. But this event happens neither to the soul, for it is the breath of life; nor to the spirit, for the spirit is simple and not composite, so that it cannot be decomposed, and is itself the life of those who receive it. We must therefore conclude that it is in reference to the flesh that death is mentioned; which [flesh], after the soul’s departure, becomes breathless and inanimate, and is decomposed gradually into the earth from which it was taken. This, then, is wat is mortal.” ⁷

Irenaeus is therefore here further arguing against the Gnostics who, he has stated, derived their principles from Plato and other pagan sources as regards the soul. Such held that souls could be immortalized only if uncreated, for if they had a beginning they must die, or cease with the body. Irenaeus has consistently maintained that absolute immortality is possessed only by God. To all other beings both their commencement and their continuance depends entirely on God. That is, the will of God must originate and determine all things. CFF1 1086.2

So Irenaeus consistently protests the Gnostic theory of a natural and necessary immortality of all “spiritual” souls, independently of the divine will, yet accepting as God’s purpose the maintenance of all responsive souls in endless being. Yet some have strangely and fallaciously claimed that Irenaeus is, in these passages, arguing in favor of Plato’s universal Innate-Immortality thesis. But such is manifestly untrue. He consistently claimed immortality to be the peculiar birthright only of the righteous redeemed. CFF1 1086.3

3. IRENAEUS UNQUESTIONABLY TAUGHT CONDITIONALISM

It is therefore clearly and emphatically evident that, according to Irenaeus, the lover of the world will lose his soul; that such will God destroy, both body and soul; that unquenchable fire will burn up the chaff; that the wicked go into the everlasting (aionion) fire, and undergo everlasting punishment, whom Irenaeus had by almost every form of speech declared to be utterly bereft of immortality and continuance. He taught that everlasting punishment means everlasting destruction and cessation of being, and that fire is the instrument of that destruction—for to be deprived of the benefit of existence is a punishment; and to be forever deprived of it is to suffer an eternal punishment. So, in opposition to the Gnostics and other kindred heretics, Irenaeus declared that such is the bleak prospect for eternity for those who live and die without God. CFF1 1086.4