The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers, vol. 1

III. The Resurrection—Wholly Committed to Innate-Immortality Thesis

In Athenagoras’ final work, The Resurrection of the Dead, a strong undeviating current of innate Immortal-Soulism, not found in the previous Plea, flows throughout the treatise. We therefore pause at the outset to consider the familiar charge of “inconsistency,” “vacillation,” and “conflicting statements” leveled against Athenagoras’ position on immortality. This problem can be rationally explained and fairly answered by recognizing the simple fact that a distinct change of view took place between Athenagoras’ earlier Plea (c. A.D. 177) and this treatise a decade later (c. A.D. 187). There were inklings before, but never full commitment as here. CFF1 936.1

We should press the point that if the opposing expressions were scattered over both treatises, the charge would have some valid basis. But Athenagoras’ Immortal-Soulism is concentrated in this later Resurrection discussion. In the interim he had clearly swung over to outright championship of Innate Immortality, and by the same token his former moderate views were abandoned. Athenagoras had made a complete about-face—a reversal of position. And the purpose of this new treatise is obviously to prove the resurrection of man, with soul and body, each constituting an integral part of the whole man, and therefore both sharing in the final, or common, destiny. The revolutionary character of Athenagoras’ utterances here justifies a documented presentation. CFF1 936.2

1. MAN CREATED FOR “PERPETUAL EXISTENCE.”

Athenagoras rests his entire case on the premise of the natural immortality of man. But he bases this purely on the argument of reason, with no appeal to the authority of Scripture, not even invoking Christ’s resurrection as an assurance of ours. He here holds that God’s object in making man was that he might live. And God’s sovereign purpose, Athenagoras contends, cannot be defeated. It is, he insists, impossible not to exist. Therefore all men must live forever—good and evil, happy and miserable. He thrice states this in chapter twelve: CFF1 936.3

“For nothing that is endowed with reason and judgment has been created, or is created, for the use of another, whether greater or less than itself, but for the sake of the life and continuance of the being itself so created .... According to the view which more nearly touches the beings created, He made him [man] for the sake of the life of those created, which is not kindled for a little while and then extinguished.” ¹¹ CFF1 937.1

And again— CFF1 937.2

“Since this cause [of man’s creation] is seen to lie in perpetual existence, the being so created must be preserved for ever doing and experiencing what is suitable to its nature.” ¹² CFF1 937.3

2. DUAL PREMISE FOR ETERNAL EXISTENCE

In presenting his position on the unlimited perpetuity of human existence, which he does as a matter of mere philosophical ethical principle, Athenagoras builds his whole argument on two premises: (1) God’s objective in bestowing such existence, and (2) the right employment of the rational nature by those who have received it. Eternity of bliss is for those who have employed their nature in accordance with the divine purpose in bestowing life upon them. CFF1 937.4

Athenagoras does not, at this stage, dilate on the term of future existence in store for the wicked. He says nothing here about their destruction, nor does he discuss either eternity of suffering or ultimate restoration. The germ of such a theory appeared in his Plea but was not developed. CFF1 937.5

3. GIST OF THE RESURRECTION ARGUMENT

In his treatise on The Resurrection of the Dead (chapter ten) Athenagoras asserts that the resurrection in general is highly advantageous to man. In chapter twelve the resurrection change in our being is for the better—nothing can occur to man that would be sufficient reason for his ceasing to be; his life is a proper end, therefore it should not be consumed and cease to be. Chapter thirteen holds that the resurrection effects a continuity of existence, and is just as much in accord with reason as the fact that man should exist at all. CFF1 937.6

In chapter nineteen it is claimed that the wicked must be punished in another life, for this life is too short and limited for a just recompense. And in chapter twenty-five each individual must be judged for himself, and rewarded or punished according to the good or evil done in this life. Thus the hope of the future is all vested in the resurrection. That Athenagoras places all hope of a future life on the resurrection is evident from these two excerpts: CFF1 938.1

“The cause of his [man’s] creation [the Creator’s “purpose” and the nature that man received] is a pledge of his continuance for ever, and this continuance is a pledge of the resurrection, without which man could not continue.” ¹³ CFF1 938.2

“But it is impossible for him to continue unless he rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature of men as men would not continue.” ¹⁴ CFF1 938.3

4. RESURRECTED BODIES WILL BE INCORRUPTIBLE

In his argument Athenagoras contends that a resurrection is not “impossible for God.” And in chapter three (“He Who Could Create, Can Also Raise Up the Dead”) he states: CFF1 938.4

“That same power can reunite what is dissolved, and raise up what is prostrate, and restore the dead to life again, and put the corruptible into a state of incorruptible.” ¹⁵ CFF1 938.5

Throughout several chapters he holds that the resurrection body differs from the present in that it will be incorruptible, and he maintains that God can and will “raise up and bring together again a body which has been dissolved,” and make it “not liable to corruption.” ¹⁶ CFF1 938.6

5. DESTINED FOR “PERPETUAL DURATION,” NOT FINAL EXTINCTION

In chapter twelve Athenagoras presses the argument for the resurrection, namely, “The Purpose Contemplated in Man’s Creation.” He was not created “at random,” but “for the sake of life and continuance of the being itself so created.” ¹⁷ God made man “in pursuance of the goodness and wisdom which are conspicuous throughout the creation.” And Athenagoras adds that God did not make man to be “kindled for a little while and then extinguished.” ¹⁸ Men were brought into being for “perpetual duration.” Thus: CFF1 939.1

“To those who bear upon them the image of the Creator Himself, and are endowed with understanding, and blessed with a rational judgment, the Creator has assigned perpetual duration, in order that, recognising their own Maker, and His power and skill, and obeying law and justice, they may pass their whole existence free from suffering, in the possession of those qualities with which they have bravely borne their preceding life, although they lived in corruptible and earthly bodies.” ¹⁹ CFF1 939.2

6. UNCEASING EXISTENCE FORESTALLS ULTIMATE ANNIHILATION

This being the purpose of man’s perpetual existence, ultimate annihilation is consequently unthinkable: CFF1 939.3

“That which was created for the very purpose of existing and living a life naturally suited to it, since the cause itself [of its existence] is bound up with its nature, and is recognised only in connection with existence itself, can never admit of any cause which shall utterly annihilate its existence. But since this cause is seen to lie in perpetual existence, the being so created must be preserved for ever, doing and experiencing what is suitable to its nature.” ²⁰ CFF1 939.4

Then he adds: “For the resurrection is a species of change, and the last of all, and a change for the better of what still remains in existence at that time.” ²¹ CFF1 939.5

7. PLEDGED CONTINUANCE OF “BEING IN IMMORTALITY.”

So in our “present state of existence” we “steadfastly hope for a continuance of being in immortality,” for Athenagoras contends that He who “fashioned us,” “made man of an immortal soul and a body, and furnished him with understanding and an innate law” ²² suited to “intelligent existence,” that he might “continue always” in such contemplation. Then he adds: CFF1 939.6

“The cause of his [man’s] creation is a pledge of his continuance for ever, and this continuance is a pledge of the resurrection, without which man could not continue. So that, from what has been said, it is quite clear that the resurrection is plainly proved by the cause of man’s creation, and the purpose of Him who made him.” ²³ CFF1 940.1

8. MAN: AN IMMORTAL SOUL IN A PERISHABLE BODY

Having dealt with “the purpose of God in forming men,” Athenagoras now comes, in chapter fifteen, to the “nature of the men created.” On this he explicitly declares: CFF1 940.2

“The whole nature of men in general is composed of an immortal soul and a body which was fitted to it in the creation, and if neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, has God assigned such a creation or such a life and entire course of existence as this, but to men compounded of the two, in order that they may, when they have passed through their present existence, arrive at one common end, with the same elements of which they are composed at their birth and during life, it unavoidably follows, since one living-being is formed from the two.” ²⁴ CFF1 940.3

So the term “immortal soul” is now established. And Athenagoras is the first Christian to use it. It was an epochal development. CFF1 940.4

9. RESURRECTION IMPERATIVE SO BODY-SOUL MAY CONTINUE FOREVER

Thus Athenagoras builds up an entire integrated series—man’s creation, nature, life, doings, sufferings, existence—and the “end” suited to his nature, which makes it the same as its constitution. Thus: “The parts dissolved [in death] are again united for the constitution of the being.” ²⁵ CFF1 940.5

Then he reiterates: CFF1 940.6

“Man, therefore, who consists of the two parts, must continue for ever. But it is impossible for him to continue unless he rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature of men as men would not continue.” ²⁶ CFF1 940.7

10. CONTINUITY OF BEING INTERRUPTED BY DEATH

In chapter sixteen Athenagoras introduces death as a “sleep.” “Life,” he says at the outset, is “a continuance of being which is interrupted by death and corruption.” Some “superior beings,” like the angels, “are wholly incorruptible and immortal,” and have no interruption. Such are “from the first created immortal, and continue to exist without end.” But men “have from their first origin an unchangeable continuance, but in respect of the body obtain immortality by means of change.” This is what is meant by the “doctrine of the resurrection.” ²⁷ That is why “we both await the dissolution of the body, as the sequel to a life of want and corruption, and after this we hope for a continuance with immortality.” ²⁸ CFF1 941.1

11. “SLEEP” OF DEATH INVOLVES BLACKOUT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Athenagoras introduces this interesting analogy of death and sleep, calling “sleep the brother of death“: CFF1 941.2

“Although the relaxation of the senses and of the physical powers, which naturally takes place in sleep, seems to interrupt the sensational life when men sleep at equal intervals of time, and, as it were, come back to life again, yet we do not refuse to call it life; and for this reason, I suppose, some call sleep the brother of death.” ²⁹ CFF1 941.3

Then follows this statement of unconsciousness common to both death and sleep: CFF1 941.4

“Those who are dead and those who sleep are subject to similar states, as regards at least the stillness and the absence of all sense of the present or the past, or rather of existence itself and their own life.” ³⁰ CFF1 941.5

So the continuity of life, followed by the dissolution of death, “involves the resurrection,” although suffering is interrupted for a time. CFF1 941.6

12. REUNION OF BODY AND SOUL NECESSARY FOR RECOMPENSE

In chapter eighteen man is recognized as clearly accountable to his God and Maker, for “all created things require the attention of the Creator.” Man is “accountable for all his actions, and receives for them either reward or punishment.” But after the period of dissolution, when the soul is separated from the body, which no longer retains “the remembrance of its actions,” soul and body will be “again united,” to “receive what ... has been done by the body, whether good or evil.” ³¹ Passing over those who expect to “eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,” with life to terminate in “utter insensibility,” Athenagoras observes that our present moral nature could not in this life bear “a punishment commensurate” with sin, for death “prevents the deserved punishment,” that is, “a penalty adequate to these crimes.” ³² CFF1 941.7

13. MAN’S PUNISHMENT NOT ASSIGNED TO SOUL ALONE

In chapter twenty Athenagoras maintains that “Man Must Be Possessed Both of a Body and Soul Hereafter, That the judgment Passed Upon Him May Be Just.” ³³ Recognizing the corruptibility of the body with only two possibilities regarding the soul, he says: CFF1 942.1

“Either death is the entire extinction of life, the soul being dissolved and corrupted along with the body, or the soul remains by itself, incapable of dissolution, of dispersion, of corruption, whilst the body is corrupted and dissolved, retaining no longer any remembrance of past actions, nor sense of what it experienced in connection with the soul.” ³⁴ CFF1 942.2

But, he continues, if life is ultimately to be “utterly extinguished,” the logical drift of such life would be into atheism. And if the soul alone were to be immortal, no judgment would be equitable. ³⁵ Punishment must be for the sins done in the body. The same principle would be true of the body alone. But, according to chapter twenty-one, “the life of man is one, though composed of the two.” ³⁶ Then he adds, in chapter twenty-two, that it is absurd that “reward or punishment ... should be assigned to the soul alone.” ³⁷ And he refers again, at the close of chapter twenty-four, to “men possessed of an immortal soul and rational judgment.” ³⁸ CFF1 942.3

14. RECONSTITUTION OF BODY AND SOUL INTO SAME BEING

In the concluding chapter (twenty-five), Athenagoras once more reiterates that man is a dual being, composed of two parts in this present life. But “the man cannot be said to exist when the body is dissolved.” ³⁹ Then comes his summarizing declaration: CFF1 943.1

“It is absolutely necessary that the end of a man’s being should appear in some reconstitution of the two together, and of the same living being. And as this follows of necessity, there must by all means be a resurrection of the bodies which are dead, or even entirely dissolved, and the same men must be formed anew, since the law of nature ordains the end not absolutely, nor as the end of any men whatsoever, but of the same men who passed through the previous life; but it is impossible for the same men to be reconstituted unless the same bodies are restored to the same souls.” ⁴⁰ CFF1 943.2

15. THOSE FAILING GOD’S OBJECTIVE ARE PUNISHED PROPORTIONATELY

Thus, in the end, the “intelligent life and rational judgment” of the reconstituted man will “delight unceasingly in the contemplation of Him who is”—the eternal God. But that “large number of those who fail of the end that belongs to them does not make void the common lot, since the examination relates to the individual and the reward or punishment of lives ill or well spent, is proportionate to the merit of each.” ⁴¹ CFF1 943.3

16. DENIES ULTIMATE ANNIHILATION FOR THE WICKED

Athenagoras does not directly discuss the ultimate fate of the lost, nor does he indicate whether all will ultimately be saved. That is left for Tertullian and his school to declare, and for Augustine to climax. Nor does he consider Restorationism. That is left for Origen and those who follow him. But Athenagoras denies the ultimate annihilation of the wicked. And the body will share in man’s eternal destiny. In this he veers away from Plato, who claims immortality only for the soul. Plato taught a natural and unconditional immortality of the soul, and dealt with physical and metaphysical factors. Athenagoras deals with moral, practical, and circumstantial elements. But the trend was now clearly set. CFF1 943.4

17. DISREGARDS AND REPUDIATES THE BIBLICAL “PERISH.”

Attention must be called to Athenagoras’ use of the Greek word for “perish.” He excelled in Greek, and knew well its meaning. Thus in one place he describes the Epicurean doctrine of annihilation of body and soul by saying that they maintained they are to “perish.” In another place he says it has the same meaning as “annihilate.” In a third he contrasts that which is perishable with that which is eternal. And in still another he describes the Stoic doctrine (that all things will one day come to an end) by saying they teach that they will perish. ⁴² CFF1 944.1

How then did Athenagoras use the term perish when he speaks of both just and unjust? He simply denies that the term can be applied to either class. He says that if the unjust were to perish, it would be equivalent to saying they would be annihilated—a Latin word (annihilatus) meaning “destroyed,” or “brought to nothing.” Accordingly, he boldly says of the unjust as well as the just, “God has not made us ... that we should perish and be annihilated.” ⁴³ Yet the Word repeatedly says the wicked will “perish”—and Athenagoras knew the meaning of his own Greek. He therefore flatly contradicted and abandoned the platform of Scripture in introducing his novel doctrine of eternal life in hell, even if not expressly stated. CFF1 944.2