The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers, vol. 1

IV. Dialogue—Righteous to Be Immortalized; Wicked Destroyed

Because of the key position occupied by Justin as first of the ante-Nicene witnesses, his entire testimony needs to be surveyed that comprehensive deductions of his positions may be made. First in point of production comes his Dialogue With Trypho. This grew out of a challenge by this noted Pharisee while Justin was in Ephesus at the Xystus, or place of disputations. ⁴⁰ Their discussion is cast in the form of a Socratic dialogue, and is a quasi-biographical sketch of Justin himself, presented through the lips of the aged Christian of venerable manners, ⁴¹ whose views were actually Justin’s own. CFF1 827.2

Here Justin repeatedly denies the inherent immortality of the soul, contending that the “worthy” will be given eternal life, whereas the “wicked” will be punished as long as God determines is just, then will pass into nonexistence. To prepare the way for the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked, Justin first refuted the Platonic postulate of perpetual selfexistence and the natural and indefeasible immortality, or endless permanence, of the soul. His arguments are the more remarkable because he had once been an ardent Platonist. CFF1 827.3

1. CATEGORICALLY DENIES INNATE IMMORTALITY AND TRANSMIGRATION

Answering (in chapter four) the question “Is the soul also divine and immortal?” and a part of Deity? Justin categorically denies that it is a part of Deity. And he absolutely rejects the Platonic concept of the “pre-existence and eternity” of souls, and its contention that they “transmigrate into other bodies,” and are “imprisoned in the bodies of certain wild animals” as a form of punishment. ⁴² Then comes Justin’s declaration, “Nor ought it [the soul] to be called immortal; for if it is immortal, it is plainly unbegotten” (uncreated), in contrast with the Platonic contention that “it [the soul] is both unbegotten and immortal.” ⁴³ And this is buttressed by the declaration “If the world is begotten [“created”], souls are necessarily begotten, and perhaps at one time they were not in existence.” ⁴⁴ That was his approach. CFF1 827.4

2. SOME “NEVER DIE”; OTHERS SUFFER DETERMINATE PUNISHMENT

To the direct question “They are not, then, immortal?” comes Justin’s emphatic “No.” ⁴⁵ Then he adds, “But I do not say, indeed, that all souls die; for that were truly a piece of good fortune to the evil.” The disposition of all souls awaits the “time of judgment.” Then follows the declaration of the future: “Thus some which have appeared worthy of God never die; but others are punished so long as God wills them to exist and to be punished.” ⁴⁶ CFF1 828.1

Thus Justin asserts, by antithesis, that the wicked finally cease to exist, after punishment as long as God shall determine. While the Greek expression for “all souls” may be ambiguous, strong bias has been revealed by some translators by substituting “any souls,” or even “no souls,” ⁴⁷ and by unjustifiably injecting the thougt of “a place of misery and torment” during the interim. CFF1 828.2

3. CREATED BEINGS MAY BE “BLOTTED OUT AND CEASE TO EXIST.”

Contending that created beings may be “blotted out and cease to exist,” Justin maintains that “God alone is unbegotten and incorruptible.” Therefore created souls “both die and are punished.” CFF1 828.3

“‘“For those things which exist after (note 1: “beside”) God, or shall at any time exist, these have the nature of decay, and are such as may be blotted out and cease to exist; for God alone is unbegotten and incorruptible, and therefore He is God, but all other things after Him are created and corruptible. For this reason souls both die and are punished.”’” ⁴⁸ CFF1 829.1

4. SEPARATED FROM BODY, SOUL CEASES TO EXIST

That the soul “is or has life” is incontestable, but, Is that life inherent, or is it received as a “partaker”? This is the question asked in chapter six. Justin’s answer is unequivocal, and cannot be misunderstood. He denies that the soul could live separated, or apart, from the body. Life comes by the will and provision of God; otherwise the soul “must cease to exist.” CFF1 829.2

“‘“Now the soul partakes of life, since God wills it to live. Thus, then, it will not even partake [of life] when God does not will it to live. For to live is not its attribute, as it is God’s; but as a man does not live always, and the soul is not for ever conjoined with the body, since, whenever this harmony must be broken up, the soul leaves the body, and the man exists no longer; even so, whenever the soul must cease to exist, the spirit of life is removed from it, and there is no more soul, but it goes back to the place from whence it was taken.”’” ⁴⁹ CFF1 829.3

There is a vast difference between the two ideas of “would not live if God did not choose,” and “will not live when God does not choose.” CFF1 829.4

5. CHRIST COMING AGAIN TO DESTROY THE WICKED

Justin reminds Trypho, in the intervening chapters, that righteousness comes not by the law, nor by Jewish rites (chapters twelve to fourteen); that there is no salvation “except through Christ” (chapter twenty-six); and that “true righteousness” is obtained only in Christ (chapter thirty)—whose power is now great, but will be much greater at the Second Advent (chapter thirty-one). He then “distinguishes” between “the two advents”—the first in humility for salvation, and the second in glory for judgment and rewards (chapters thirty-two, thirty-three). Justin then warns about false Christians who abandon the “pure doctrine of Jesus Christ,” in contrast with those who are “faithful and steadfast in the hope announced by Him” (chapter thirty-five). But the Lord, who was crucified, arose, and ascended to Heaven, marks those who persecute the saints, “until He come again, and destroy them all, and render to each his deserts” (chapter thirty-nine). CFF1 829.5